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By Sarah Wildman, Foreign Policy Correspondent
Source:
September 1, 2010
As Barack Obama appeared on television Tuesday to declare the end of the U.S. combat role in Iraq, were viewers happiest in Baghdad, Washington, D.C., or Tehran?
The obvious answer would seem to be Washington or Baghdad. In fact, some analysts believe the real winner of the war in Iraq is neither the Iraqis, nor Americans, but the Iranians. It’s a sobering analysis, especially in light of the United Nations-imposed and U.S.-backed against Iran, intended to to influence the country’s intractable position on its nuclear capability.
adjunct senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote Monday at the GlobalPost.com: “In February 2003, as he marshaled the United States for war, President George W. Bush declared: ‘A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.’ Now, as the U.S. military concludes its combat role . . . Iraq is indeed a dramatic example for the Middle East, but not in the ways that Bush and his administration envisioned. Iraq did not become a beacon of democracy, nor did it create a domino effect that toppled other dictatorial regimes in the Arab world. Instead, the Iraq war has unleashed a new wave of sectarian hatred and upset the Persian Gulf’s strategic balance, helping Iran consolidate its role as the dominant regional power.”
Reached by phone in Beirut, Bazzi elaborated in an interview with Politics Daily. The bottom line, Bazzi explained, was that “Iran has basically leap-frogged the U.S. in the level of influence that it can exert on most Iraqi factions.” Bazzi said, underscored how effective Iranian influence has been, especially with maneuvering between Iraq’s Shiite factions. “I’d argue that Iran started filling the political void that the U.S. has left in Iraq years ago, and now it becomes even easier with fewer U.S. troops,” he said, noting that the that will remain on the ground concern the Iranians. “On a political level, Iranians have played politics in Iraq much more effectively than the U.S. Part of that is that all the Iraqi factions recognized that Iran is not going anywhere, but the U.S. was going to leave, but the Iraqis are stuck with their neighbors.” The Iranians, he said, are “getting a little concerned about the political stalemate in Iraq.” Iranians, Bazzi said, are “keen on playing this role of the political broker.” To that end, they called almost the entire Iraqi leadership to Tehran right after elections. “The Iranians view their strategic interest in Iraq on several levels. Immediate, of maintaining a friendly government in Baghdad, because they don’t want to go back to the days of Saddam where there was an extremely adversarial threat next door. The Iranians will want a friendly, Shiite-led government in Baghdad, and they see that as the new reality.”
A weak Iraq is also in Iran’s interest, Bazzi explained. “If Iraq is not as dominate as it once was, if it is friendly and compliant, then it enables Iran to maintain regional dominance in the Persian Gulf.” Finally, he said, Iraq has become a “bargaining chip and a proxy in their conflict with the United States.”
It’s in Iran’s best interest that U.S. political influence diminish in Iraq, said Bazzi. Ironically, a door has opened, partly as a result of the Obama administration’s minimal attempts to try and influence Iraqi decision making. That “hands-off approach has backfired a little bit — the Iranians are perfectly willing to get down and dirty and get heavily involved.”
Bazzi noted there there are many entry points into Iraqi society. An oppressive heat wave in June brought temperatures reaching up to 50 degrees Celsius in Iraq. The combination of blackouts, electricity failures, and general lack of electricity provoked riots; not only was there no air conditioning, it was hard to watch the World Cup.
“Seven years after the U.S. invasion, there is still no reliable electrical grid. It’s true that electrical output is higher than in the time of Saddam, and Saddam had a policy of diverting output to Baghdad and to Sunni cities and leaving other parts of country in dark. But that failure to provide electricity and drinking water and basic services are good examples of the frustration Iraqis feel at their own government and frustration they feel at the U.S. that really dampened any sense of joy . . .They don’t see basic, everyday life issues getting resolved.”
And that frustration opens the door further to outside influence, including from Tehran.