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By Roozbeh Mirebrahimi

Source: Rooz Online

October 21, 2010

Years ago whenever family friends and my acquaintances got together with me, because I was a journalist, I would always be asked questions related to issues of the day. Most of these individuals were busy with their normal lives and showed little interest in following the daily ups and downs of the political issues of the day.

But I was interested in the political issues of the day and being a journalist followed what was going on. Because of these, they always viewed me to be knowledgeable about what was going on, even events behind the scene. So every time we met, questions followed one after another.

But the most basic question that everybody would ask was “Who is running the regime” or “Who is responsible, who is guiding, and which agency is in charge?”

Everybody wanted to know how the different agencies and political bodies worked and where did open and hidden power really reside. The majority of people of course were not that interested or would say that “they are all alike,” and simply stay aloof. Even today of course there are those inside and outside Iran who look at things this way.

What was interesting for me was that outside Iran and even among foreigners these very questions were important, and had remained unanswered. Every time I would meet someone, invariably the first question always was, “Who is really in charge in the Islamic republic?”

Well, if the response to this question was simple, then we would not be talking about the Islamic republic. The combination of these two terms, Islamic and republic, is indicative of the complexity which only becomes deeper as time passes.

I will try to explain the power structure in the Islamic republic from my perspective. But since this is a big topic, I will only write about the changes in the power/political structure of Iran that have taken place since the controversial and disputed 2009 presidential election.

I believe that the history of the Islamic republic is now highlighted with what it was before 2009 and what it is now, i.e., since the June 2009 election. Prior to the election, the structure looked like this:
The Leader of the Islamic regime was on top of all the institutions
The Guardians Council, the Majlis
The government
The judiciary branch
Assembly of Experts on Leadership
Military and security forces
The Expediency Council
The national radio and television network, and,
Economic foundations and institutions.

This is the list of the most important institutions exercising power and authority in the Islamic republic. And while legally, all of the institutions operated under the Leader, the fact that some of them had popularly elected individuals made it possible that some critics too would become part of this state machinery.

Still, the structure was such that ultimate authority rested with the leader.

The events of the reform period (i.e., when Mohammad Khatami was president between 1997-2005), was the period when the power struggle demonstrated the extent of flexibility this state machinery had. Prior to the 2009 election, the leader of the Islamic state strived to present himself as above factional fighting and to be neutral in such conflicts. He avoided entering the fields on the side of one contender. He was of course not always successful in this goal and on occasions did intervene on behalf of a group or a person. At times, he would also dole out benefits to both opposing and battling factions. For example, he issued the order to eliminate the press law during the sixth Majlis that was being advanced by the moderates. Soon after that, he vetoed the Guardians Council’s annulment of mayoral elections in Tehran. In view of the victories of the reformist in those days, the Guardians Council had intended to annul the elections in Tehran in which the reformist had taken the upper hand. On another occasion, the leader ordered the review of seventh Majlis candidates which had been disqualified by the Guardians Council (despite the disregard for this by the Guardians Council). On still another occasion, he ordered the suspension of Majlis’ efforts to impeach those cabinet ministers in Mohammad Khatami’s administration who had resigned en masse. And finally, during ninth presidential elections, when the Guardians Council had disqualified a candidate (Mostafa Moin), he intervened to annul his disqualification, which resulted in his return to the candidacy.

From my perspective, all of these measures were merely to portray the façade of the neutrality of the leader, because his orders were in fact not followed up on the ground.

Prior to the elections, some institutions such as the judiciary and the legislature, tried, like the leader, to display some form of independence. For example even though power was wielded in influencing the outcome of certain court cases, the effort continued to show that whatever actions were taken were based on law and followed legal procedures. Prior to the elections, there were many cases that demonstrated that political influencing continued in the judiciary, but there were also measures to make things appear to be legal. In general, international and political costs of intervention were considered and calculated.

While the Majlis had become more limited in its scope when compared to the reform period, its position of being the legislative body was never challenged or damaged. Differences about the qualifications and the election procedures existed, but these did not touch on the authority or power of the Majlis.

Prior to the 2009 election, the armed forces, and the security forces, particularly the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) strived to remain behind the scenes. And while in recent years, these had expanded their economic activities and relationships, they never officially intervened or took power into their hands. The para-military forces had from years before started their encroachment into the election process to take over its control and when these were publicly protested (by some such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mehdi Karoubi and seyed Hassan Khomeini), they completely negated their attempts.

The State Expediency Council which played a greater role during Mohammad Khatami’s presidency, lost its impact during Ahmadinejad’s administration. This institution was led by Hashemi Rafsanjani right from the day of its creation, during his presidency. Ayatollah Khamenei used this institution for his own purposes. During Khatami’s years other parallel organizations were formed and after Ahmadinejad came to power the powers and role of this agency were reduced to a ceremonial position.

Assembly of Experts too has turned into a ceremonial institutions in the Islamic republic, while legally its remains the most powerful body that can control and direct the whole system.

So prior to the 2009 election, in the Islamic republic there were always openings for critics and reformers to play some limited role in the political system.

After the 2009 Election
Since the 2009 presidential election, the Islamic republic has undergone a dramatic change. There is a deep difference between the role of political institutions in it.

Its political and economic bodies have undergone a change in their nature. In short, the Islamic republic has removed its mask it wore in the past and has therefore actually become more transparent in the sense that what you see is exactly what the real intentions and roles are. This transparency has been for greater more right-wing activities.

The IRGC, which was a military organization, has now turned into a powerful economic cartel and expanded its activities in all political spheres of the Islamic republic. The largest economic and business groups are gradually falling under the control of the IRGC.

Regarding the Majlis, not only has the legislature become void of real representatives of the people, but is whole raison d’être has come into question. After the election, its two main functions that of passing laws and monitoring the management of the country have been sidelined by the indirect or direct actions of the leader, or one of his subordinate bodies.

The State Expediency Council which at one time was the arm of the leader, has turned into a nuisance for him and its powers have been taken away from it. It plays no role in the current power structure.

The Judiciary has for all practical purposes turned into a tool in the hands of the IRGC. The attempts to present the branch as an independent one have all gone. The branches and courts across the country have no qualms in presenting themselves as mere tools of the Guards.

The Assembly of Experts on Leadership continues to be a ceremonial body. And while some of its members express some criticism over some issues, in reality this body has no role in the current power structure.

So the actual players in the field have diminished since the presidential race of 2009. The leader is now associated to be affiliated to one battling faction in the on-going power competition and battles. The IRGC is now the main arm of the leader in running the country. This monolith is what will in fact shorten the life of the Islamic regime.

The answer to the often asked question, therefore, is now easier to respond to.  When a political structure becomes so hierarchical and single-factional, it is easier to comprehend its workings.

I view the change to this monolith be an indication of the power of Iran’s green movement. To implement any meaningful change in meeting the rights of people prior to the election, it was necessary to disrupt the existing political super structure. Since the elections, the balance has been disrupted. Today, no decision in the country can be taken without considering the green movement, whether they be international or at the daily level.

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The US drive to isolate Tehran is unrelenting but there is little evidence Iran’s leadership will change its ways

By Simon Tisdall

Source: Guardian

October 21, 2010

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s provocative posturing in Lebanon last week showed Iran is unlikely to change its ways. Photograph: Nabil Mounzer/EPA

The US is quietly ratcheting up economic and financial pressure on Iran amid signs that talks about Tehran’s suspect nuclear programme could resume next month. These two developments may be connected. But neither sanctions nor diplomacy can wholly obviate the dread possibility of military confrontation unless something fundamental changes soon at the heart of Iran’s fundamentalist regime.

The US squeeze has been gathering force since July, when Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act, which in effect denies foreign banks access to the US financial system if they trade with targeted Iranian banks and businesses or the country’s Revolutionary Guards.

Following the latest round of UN security council sanctions in June, the EU, Japan, Australia and other western allies passed their own measures further restricting investment in Iran’s energy sector. Then, last month, the Obama administration gained the agreement of leading European oil companies to stop investing and trading with Iran.

One dramatic consequence of this steady tightening of the screw is the increasing difficulties encountered by Iran Air, the state airline, in refuelling its planes in Europe. BP and Shell have reportedly cancelled jet fuel deliveries and other companies say they will follow suit when current contracts expire. What Iran Air called “ongoing fuel supply problems at London Heathrow” has meant its direct flights from there to Tehran have effectively ceased. Its other routes also face growing disruption.

The US drive to isolate Tehran is unrelenting, impacting collaborators and competitors alike. An anonymous official recently briefed US media that “a significant list” of Chinese companies and banks were continuing to provide restricted technology and materials to Iran – and that the US had sent a senior envoy to Beijing to protest. The move embarrassed China into publicly reiterating its commitment to upholding the sanctions regime.

Turkey and Azerbaijan, two of Iran’s close neighbours, were on the receiving end this week when Stuart Levey, the US treasury department’s under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, came calling. Levey said he intended to brief private and public sector businesses about Iran’s “illicit conduct” and urge government leaders to ensure sanctions were enforced. US officials have undertaken similar arm-twisting missions in the Gulf and across the Arab and Muslim world.

Reports from Tehran suggest the sanctions are biting, although to what degree is unclear. In addition to the usual complaints about unemployment and inflation, there seems to be growing unhappiness about shortages and pay. The culture ministry issued a warning to print media that they faced closure if they reported opposition criticism. And dozens of reform activists are said to have been jailed in a new round of repression in recent weeks.

There are worries, too, about the public’s response to much-delayed plans by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to slash the huge $100bn annual bill for state subsidies for food and other staples. These concerns prompted a leading pro-regime cleric, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, to warn Ahmadinejad last week to tread carefully.

All the same, Washington’s sanctions enforcement drive faces considerable difficulties. Chinese machinations aside, there is resistance to the measures in Turkey and Iraq, where Iran exerts considerable influence. Turkey, for example, depends on Tehran for about one-third of its energy needs. In Iraq, the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, seems to depend on Tehran for his job.

Speaking earlier this month, Shamseddin Hosseini, Iran’s finance minister, admitted sanctions had caused “some kind of problem for us”. But he insisted Iran had large reserves of hard currency and would overcome any obstacles the US and others laid in its path. “The world is big, and the people who are trading [with us] find ways to transfer money,” he said. “When you block the stream of water, it goes another route.”

As if to underscore its determination not to succumb, Iran announced on Wednesday that its 20% uranium enrichment programme, the focus of US nuclear weapons concerns, was advancing apace. Its stockpile now amounts to 30kg and is steadily rising. Tehran also said it might rejoin the stalled nuclear talks next month. But, as ever, it seems likely to try to limit the scope of the discussions in ways the US and partners may find unacceptable.

Even if the talks do recommence, few people would be rash enough to suggest they will achieve a breakthrough after so many past disappointments. Despite all the pressure and despite some positive signs in recent months, there is little or no evidence so far that Iran’s top leadership is willing, or can be forced, to fundamentally change its ways. Ahmadinejad’s provocative posturing in Lebanon last week made that plain enough. And so the dread juggernaut of direct, physical confrontation rolls ever closer.

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Iran has been increasingly aggressive in its persecution of journalists, both foreign and local. Only recently, two German journalists were arrested after they tried to interview the son of a woman who has been sentenced to death by stoning for allegedly having committed adultery. Here, activists protest against the sentence in Paris in August.

By Dieter Bednarz, Markus Brauck and Antje Windmann

Source: Spiegel Online

October 18, 2010

ozens of Iranian journalists are languishing in prison with scores more having recently fled the country. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime has been aggressive in its pursuit of critics — and increasingly, foreign journalists are being rounded up as well.

Mohammad Ghouchani, 34, is still a free man. But he may not be for much longer. The Iranian regime’s security forces have been following the journalist’s every move for weeks now. According to Ghouchani’s colleagues in Tehran, it was only a week ago that Iranian agents called him on the phone. Their message? Drop the project or we’ll arrest you.

Few would be surprised were Ghouchani soon to be served a subpoena from the state prosecutor and forced to answer charges before the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Jail time, experience shows, could also be in his future — all because he has taken on a tempting and delicate mission: He plans to resume publishing Ham-Mihan, a newspaper that was banned three years ago.

Founded in 2000, the daily Ham-Mihan, or “Compatriot”, established itself as a reformist voice under the comparatively liberal former President Mohammad Khatami and achieved a circulation of over 100,000. Now the authorities have granted a new license to the former publisher, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, who was the mayor of Tehran for many years and is a close ally of Khatami.

In a spacious apartment in the affluent north of Tehran, a team of 30 editors, layout artists and technicians are working under Ghouchani to produce the first edition, with an initial print run of approximately 25,000. Although the Iranian constitution ensures freedom of the press, officials in the Ministry of Justice and on the Press Supervisory Board are only waiting for the first critical story to appear on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his mentor, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iranian Intelligence Minister Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejeie. The country's secret service has not been shy recently about persecuting those who would report critically on the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Very Good Company

Indeed, there is little doubt that the authorities will shut down Ham-Mihan again and arrest editor-in-chief Ghouchani, who has already spent half a year behind bars. While in jail, he found himself in very good company.

Ever since the protests against Ahmadinejad’s re-election in June of last year, prison cells have been bursting with critics of the regime — and journalists represent the largest professional group among the inmates. Over 120 employees of daily newspapers and some 20 bloggers have been detained, says Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam. From his home in exile, the co-founder of Iran Human Rights has been monitoring the “brutal oppression of freedom of speech.” At least 50 reporters and photographers have fled abroad to escape the regime’s agents, he says.

Nobody knows exactly how many journalists are behind bars. Amiry-Moghaddam rattles off 30 names, including Emadeddin Baghi, who was sentenced to six years in prison by a revolutionary court. His crime: an interview with Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, who died last December and ranked among the most vociferous critics of the regime. It seems a bitter irony of history that the Islamic Republic, which emerged from the revolution against the dictatorial rule of the shah in 1979, is currently persecuting journalists more severely than virtually any other country in the world.

Foreign journalists, particularly those who received their accreditations in less restrictive times, have likewise become targets of Ahmadinejad’s allies in the intelligence agencies and in the Pasdaran — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The correspondent from the Spanish daily El País, for example, has been forced to pack her bags — she provoked the ire of the regime by interviewing Montazeri’s son. Only those who restrict themselves to harmless reports are allowed to stay.

Increasingly, foreign journalists have found themselves in the crosshairs of the Tehran regime. In April 2009, the US-Iranian journalist Roxana Saberi was sentenced to eight years in prison for espionage. She was released not long later.

Visas for Propaganda

Indeed, Tehran’s sensitivity about critical media reports on the country’s nuclear program and its enrichment of uranium means that journalists from the West are now only allowed into the country to attend propaganda events — and even then journalist visas have become a rarity. The Iranian embassy in Berlin awarded only three entry permits for a bombastically staged disarmament conference held this spring under the banner “Nuclear Energy for All — Nuclear Weapons for No One.” SPIEGEL has only been able to interview opposition leaders and regime critics following lengthy preparations and under strict secrecy.

Entering the country without permission from Ershad, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, is a foolish endeavor. The many arms of the mullahs’ intelligence agencies have the country in an even tighter grip than during the days under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the late shah of Iran. But that didn’t stop two men working for the German Axel-Springer publishing house from trying their luck last week. Were they unfamiliar with the procedure? “If they were not aware of it, they were naïve and allowed themselves to be led down a dangerous path,” admonished even the normally circumspect German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

Indeed, both men are apparently unfamiliar with the region. The reporter wrote for the mass-circulation Bild and, more recently, the Bild am Sonntag, focusing on local Berlin stories and scandals in hospitals. The freelance photographer mostly took pictures of musicians and celebrities.

The two Germans were arrested the week before last in Tabriz, the capital of the province of East Azerbaijan, over 500 kilometers (310 miles) northwest of Tehran, as they were preparing to interview Sajjad Ghaderzadeh, 22. The young man is reviled by loyal supporters of the regime because he has helped to spark an international human rights campaign. He hoped that this would help protect his mother, Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, 43, who was sentenced to death by stoning in 2006 for alleged adultery. The security forces also detained Ghaderzadeh and his mother’s lawyer, in whose office the meeting took place.

A Prelude to Espionage?

The fate of the Germans depends primarily on which faction prevails in Tehran. Iran’s ambassador in Berlin, Ali Reza Sheikh Attar, is said to be a close ally of Ahmadinejad’s, but also a pragmatist. He is reportedly very interested in a quick solution. The fact that Attar, a former journalist himself, was once a governor in the region and still maintains close contacts in Tabriz may help the journalists get off lightly. The German ambassador in Tehran, Bernd Erbel, is likewise well-connected in the country.

Still, the influence of the zealots is not to be underestimated. They don’t see the reporters as clueless journalists, searching for some scoop. Shortly after their arrest, Iranian Prosecutor General Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei expressed doubts about whether the Germans were even journalists — perhaps a prelude to espionage charges.

American-Iranian journalist Roxana Saberi, 33, experienced first-hand how quickly the hard-liners can decide to press such charges. Saberi had worked in Tehran as a correspondent for six years, including for Britain’s BBC and America’s National Public Radio. She was arrested in April last year after allegedly purchasing a bottle of wine, despite a ban on alcohol. She was later accused of working without a valid accreditation. Finally, the state prosecutor added charges of espionage.

Diplomatic observers in Tehran saw this as an attempt to sabotage improved relations with the US under the relatively new president, Barack Obama. Shortly after she was sentenced to eight years in prison, Saberi was allowed to leave the country. Tehran billed her release as a generous gesture to Washington.

Not surprisingly, government officials in Berlin who are familiar with hostage-taking and prisoner exchanges have braced themselves for prolonged negotiations in the current case of the two German journalists. “It’s a question of the political price,” says an expert who is familiar with the case — and points to the ordeal of Donald Klein. The deep-sea fisherman from Lambsheim in southwestern Germany had strayed with his boat into Iranian waters while vacationing in Dubai in late 2005. He was detained for over a year at Evin Prison on suspicion of espionage. At the time, Iranian intelligence agent Kazem Darabi was serving a sentence in Germany for his role in the assassination of four Iranian opposition figures at a Berlin restaurant in 1992.

‘Journalism Is Risky’

Darabi has since been released and Tehran can no longer speculate on swapping prisoners. The fact that the German government has recently played a prominent role in orchestrating European sanctions against the Islamic state has not exactly made negotiations go more smoothly.

Nevertheless, some people in Germany are cautiously optimistic that the journalists’ release can soon be secured. Indeed, a group of parliamentarians arrived in Tehran on Sunday for a long-planned visit. The group, which includes German Green Party co-chair Claudia Roth, intends to speak on behalf of the Germans during its talks with the Iranians.

The German reporters are said to have admitted to violating Iranian visa regulations. This could be the first step towards a solution. There are allegedly already indications from Iran that the Germans could be released after paying a fine.

If the journalists return home by the end of this week, it would be an unusually soft landing at the end of a bizarre fact-finding trip.

Even with such a happy end, though, the case would confirm what the Ham-Mihan editor-in-chief has to say. He warns colleagues explicitly of the dangers of their profession. “Journalism in Iran is risky,” Ghouchani says.

Translated from the German by Paul Cohen

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Thousands of Hezbollah sympathizers welcomed the Iranian president in Lebanon, but at home, even his supporters are questioning his economic policies.

By Zvi Bar’el

Source: Haaretz

October 20, 2010

On his trip to the southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbail last week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was greeted by thousands of Hezbollah sympathizers who held up his picture and waved Iranian flags. But back home, especially after it was reported that Tehran would give Lebanon a $450 million long-term loan, both rivals and supporters of the Iranian president were up in arms.

How is it possible, they wanted to know, that Iran is going to help Lebanon while people stand in line in the streets of Tehran to fill reserve containers with gasoline in anticipation of the expected cut in government fuel subsidies. Ahmadinejad’s plan to eliminate within five years some $100 billion in annual subsidies on fuel, electricity and some basic consumer goods has already been severely criticized within Iran. In Friday sermons in the mosques, preachers have referred fearfully to the inflation that is expected in the wake of the cuts.

A television image of a meeting between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut October 14, 2010. Photo by: Channel 2

Even radical conservatives are heeding the public complaints.

“The government must not do anything that will cause displeasure to the public,” Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati said in a sermon in Tehran on Friday. “I have said many times that the prices of water and electricity are too high and I have suggested that they should not be raised. But if there is no choice but to raise them, this must be explained to the public and the people must be convinced.”

No liberal reformist, Jannati heads Iran’s powerful Guardian Council, whose purpose is to examine the constitutionality of the legislation passed by parliament. He is considered close to Ahmadinejad and, until now at least, has been a staunch supporter. And when the government executed two demonstrators in January, Jannati declared that the executions should continue until all opposition to the election results was quashed. But even hard-line clerics like Jannati are reluctant to push the people too hard, fearing that Ahmadinejad’s economic reform will affect the stability of the regime.

At present, the price of gasoline is approximately 10 cents per liter, but it is expected to rise fourfold. This is Iran’s way of circumventing the effects of economic sanctions and lessening its dependence on imported gasoline and consumer goods from abroad. In order to offset the expected rise in prices, the Iranian government intends, at least in the first year, to give back part of the savings to the public in the form of grants for installing energy-saving devices.

Although the price of gasoline has not yet risen, Iranians are already anticipating rations. According to figures released by the International Atomic Energy Agency, imports of gasoline dropped by some 15 percent in July and are expected to drop even further in the coming months.

At the same time, the government has decided to impose a 3 percent value added tax, leading the merchants in the bazaars to declare a strike that lasted several days, to demand that the government rescind it. Reports from Iran say there have been long lines at ATMs because residents want to use their rials to buy dollars and gold, since they fear the Iranian currency will drop even further, beyond the 13 percent it has already slid.

Unauthorized money changers are reportedly offering dollars at prices much higher than those at the banks to those who do not wish to stand in line. The result is that, despite the huge reserves of foreign currency the government has, the public still wants to have dollars in its pockets. The rial’s instability has already led to a rise in prices. Iranians have to register in advance for new consignments of consumer goods like refrigerators and air conditioners, which have disappeared from the stores. Although inflation is under control and stands at around 10 percent, some fear that if the economic anxiety continues, it will shoot up, as it has in the past.

As is his habit, Ahmadinejad has promised that the sanctions will not affect the country and has blamed Western propaganda for the public’s jitters. He has promised that the weak sectors of the population will receive state protection and said there is a plan to help the needy on an individual basis, but this program has not yet been made public and the opposition press is demanding details from the president.

Criticism has come not only from the ranks of his traditional political opponents. Even a conservative like Mohsen Rezai, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards who ran for parliament in the last election, is calling on the government to re-examine the plan for reforms, since it was implemented before the new sanctions against Iran. Instead of helping weak sectors of the population directly, Rizai said, the government should be creating new places of employment. However, it is unlikely that his suggestion will be accepted.

Ahmadinejad’s program does have the support of the supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but he too is aware of the political ramifications if the poor of Iran are not able to pay their water and electricity bills.

A survey by the U.S. Congressional Research Service notes that Ahmadinejad’s five-year plan anticipates an investment of some $200 billion in the development of its oil fields and the construction of oil refineries. Of this sum, Iran requires foreign investments amounting to some $125 billion, while the rest will come from its own capital. The sanctions against Iran make it unlikely that it will achieve these targets, and that, combined with Ahmadinejad’s economic policy, portends a difficult economic period for Iran that could lead also to political upheaval.

All of this will not have an effect, in the short term, on Iran’s investment in Lebanon – or in Latin America, where it is currently putting out feelers – nor will donations to groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad be affected, since they come from special funds of the Revolutionary Guards. All the same, for all the support Ahmadinejad enjoyed during his Lebanese visit, he will have to take a close look at affairs at home if he wants to ensure that the Iranian population does not desert him.

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Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (right) with Mahmud Ahmadinejad during a visit to Caracas by the Iranian president in November 2009.

By Reza Taghizadeh

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)

October 19, 2010

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is due to visit Tehran this week in the wake of visits to Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. While Chavez unveiled a host of new deals while in Moscow, in Tehran the best that awaits him is reconfirmation of agreements that he signed previously with Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. That, of course, and a joint platform for launching yet another tirade against U.S. imperialism.

Chavez warmed up a bit of his criticism of Washington while he was in Moscow for the signing of an agreement under which Moscow will build and operate Venezuela’s first nuclear power plant. (One can’t help but wonder if Chavez is also trying to help smooth over troubled relations between Moscow and Iran.)

Of course, Chavez has been a familiar face in Tehran for a decade now. This week’s visit will be his ninth since 2001, when he stated during his first trip to Iran that he intended “to prepare the road for peace, justice, stability, and progress for the 21st century.” Ties between the two countries only grew stronger after Ahmadinejad was elected in May 2005.

From the very beginning, the main thing that united these two populists was their shared condemnation of what they describe as “U.S. hegemony.” Chavez has been a staunch supporter of Tehran’s controversial nuclear projects and in 2008 declared Iran has a legitimate right to develop its nuclear program. At the same time, he said Venezuela is also “interested in developing nuclear energy.”

To Tehran’s unconcealed delight, Chavez announced in January 2009 that Venezuela was severing ties with Israel to protest its invasion of the Gaza Strip. The government of Bolivia had already cut ties with Israel for the same reason. Iran has been competing with Israel for influence in Central and South America. The region has been a prime target for Iran’s diplomacy in recent years, with a focus on improving ties with Venezuela and Bolivia.

Fast Flowering

In recent months, Iran has stepped up collaboration with Cuba and Nicaragua.

In May 2008, an Israeli website published a dossier purportedly drafted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry that detailed Iran’s activities in South America. Among other things, the dossier asserted that Venezuela has been supplying Iran with uranium. It also alleged that Tehran has set up Hezbollah cells in northern Venezuela and on Margarita Island.

If cooperation between Iran and Venezuela has indeed reached such a level, it has flowered rather quickly. Prior to 2005, the two countries had only minor bilateral ties for many years. But since Ahmadinejad became president, they have regularly signed agreements in a wide range of areas. In 2007, they agreed to develop a joint petrochemical plant and signed a raft of economic-cooperation accords. The next year, they set up Veniran, a joint project to assemble tractors and Iranian-designed cars for consumers in Latin America.

But three years later, none of these bilateral agreements has been fully realized and none of the envisioned joint ventures seems close to yielding concrete results. On paper, the agreements are worth in excess of $4.5 billion. But in reality, Venezuela’s trade with Iran was less than $100 million in 2009, according to Iran’s Chamber of Commerce.

Clearly, the only two Latin American countries that naturally offer Iran opportunities for economic cooperation are Brazil and Argentina, both of which have export capabilities that dwarf Venezuela’s. In comparison, economic cooperation between Tehran and Caracas is limited by geographical distance, a lack of cultural ties, and mismatched economic strengths, as well as by many other factors. The perception of common enemies has not proven a strong enough bond to overcome these real-world limitations.

Chavez and Ahmadinejad are likely to spend their three days together this week exchanging pleasantries and pretending that “strategic ties” between their two countries are strong and growing. In reality, though, the only ones certain of these ties are the two populist presidents themselves, leaders who have a talent for ignoring the real world.

Reza Taghizadeh is a regular contributor to RFE/RL’s Radio Farda. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

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Ahmad Jalali Farahani

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)

October 18, 2010

In February, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry announced the arrest of seven members of “counterrevolutionary satellite network organizations and Zionist media,” whom it said were affiliated with the opposition Green Movement.

The ministry said the detained, whom it accused of having been trained in “various soft subversion and other sabotage techniques abroad,” had links to RFE/RL’s Radio Farda, while adding that a number of them were officially employed by the U.S. intelligence services.

A year later one of them, Ahmad Jalali Farahani, a former social editor at the semi-official Mehr news agency, speaks to “Persian Letters” about his ordeal. Jalali Farahani, who fled Iran following his release from prison, is currently seeking asylum in a country neighboring Iran.

Persian Letters: You were arrested in Iran about a year ago after you applied for a job at Radio Farda and were interviewed by our colleagues in Dubai. What happened exactly?

Ahmad Jalali Farahani: When I returned [from Dubai] I was arrested at the airport and my passport was confiscated. After a week of interrogation, [the authorities] told me that everything was fine and that I could go on with my life. They even returned me my passport and told me I could travel if I want.

Eighty-eight days after the trip, eight officers from the Intelligence Ministry came to our house. It was at night, 1 or 2 a.m., they beat me up, took away all my documents and CDs , they searched everywhere and kept asking me, “Where are your dollars and your euros, where did you hide them?”

It took those about three hours, then they told me to get dressed and said, “We’re taking you somewhere nice.” They blindfolded me and handcuffed me and took me by car to Evin prison.

Persian Letters: The Intelligence Ministry then issued a statement saying that seven people were arrested who had been trained in soft subversion and sabotage techniques and who had links with Radio Farda. You were one of them. What was the basis of the charges against you?

Jalali Farahani: When they took me in for interrogation, I asked them to tell me what was the charge against me. For three days they would torture me, harass me, and beat me. I could bear the beatings, but the psychological torture was [worse] — they would say, “We have arrested your wife and we’re going to rape her.” They kept telling me that I should tell them with whom I had been touch and received money from, they would ask: “Who did you meet in Dubai?

After three days they took me to the Evin prosecutor’s office and there I was told that I had been charged with acting against national security by contacting CIA elements in Dubai. I told them I wasn’t in touch with the CIA, I said I went to Dubai for a job interview and was not even accepted, but they kept saying that I met with CIA agents and that they trained me and gave me money to provoke people on [the anniversary of the 1979 revolution] and burn cars, chant slogans, and then record everything and send it to Radio Farda and the BBC.

Persian Letters: Did you receive any training from Radio Farda or any other organization while in Dubai? Were you contacted by any intelligence organization?

Jalali Farahani: No, it was just a [job interview]. But when I would tell [my interrogators] in Tehran that, they would say that I have to confess that I’m a spy. They would call me a spy, they wouldn’t say, “Jalali Farahani come here,” they would say, “Mr. Spy.”

They would tell me that I received $40,000 or $400,000 — I don’t remember the exact amount — to give to people so that they would take to the streets, chant slogans against the supreme leader, and chant Allah Akbar and you would record that on your cell phone and camera — they knew I’m a filmmaker — edit it and send it to Radio Farda, the BBC, and VOA. I would ask them how can one be [trained] in such things in only 48 hours, they would say, “That’s what your meeting [in Dubai] was about.”

Persian Letters: You were an editor at the Mehr news agency and you were also working with other media in Iran. Why did you decide to apply for a job at Radio Farda?

Jalali Farahani: On the night of the election at the Mehr news agency, we knew that Mahmud Ahmadinejad was not reelected because Mehr had reporters in cities across Iran and we were receiving reports every minute about the results in different cities, we knew about the votes Ahmadinejad had received and the votes that went to Mir Hossein Musavi. We even had figures about the ballot boxes from outside the country.

Around 7 p.m. when we did an approximate count of the vote, we came to the conclusion that Mir Hossein Musavi was the new president. Around 4 p.m. our reporter reported that armed Revolutionary Guards had attacked the central election office of Musavi.

Imagine, we’re there covering the news and we’re receiving all these reports, around 6 p.m. a friend of mine who worked at the “Iran” daily called me and said that the manager of the paper had told all the staff to come to work to prepare a special issue for the victory of Ahmadinejad — the election process had not ended at this point.

That night was the worst night of my career, not only me but for all my colleagues — even those who supported Ahmadinejad who were only a few at the Mehr news agency — they could see that there was fraud. We knew that it wasn’t possible that the votes had been counted so quickly and the result announced with such speed.

I remember I went to the prayer room to do the morning prayer — many of the reporters were there, one of them was crying and saying to God, “Why are we journalists in a country where fraud is taking place so easily and the vote of the people is [being stolen].” There I said, “God, please help me leave this country.”

After the election, there were the protests, the bloodshed, I as a reporter was forced to remain silent and not report about the killings of the people.

Persian Letter: To what extent were you allowed to cover the impact of sanctions on the lives of ordinary people and the economic problems they’re facing? The rising prices and difficulties in making a living is the No. 1 issue on the mind of Iranians I talked to.

Jalali Farahani: In general, any news that would be considered damaging to Ahmadinejad’s government would not be published. If it was published, then there would be such pressure from the government that the agency would be forced to delete that news or publish other news that would reject it.

Reporting on the sanctions was banned, bringing up the issue of the impact of the sanctions on the life of the people was totally banned, and if someone would do that he would be reprimanded or fired. If we wanted to report about the rising prices, we had to do it in a way that would not upset anyone.

Regarding the sanctions, let me give you an example: if the government would go for nuclear talks to [Vienna] for example and the IAEA would issue a resolution against Iran, we were not allowed [to publish] the news about it as it was. We had to say that the Islamic republic was victorious and that we were successful, it was a national victory — we would publish the news upside down.

– Golnaz Esfandiari

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By Ahmed Al-Jarallah

Source: Arab Times

October 19, 2010

THE recent visit of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to Saudi Arabia was a step in the right direction. It was aimed at strengthening coordination between the two nations through an in-depth discussion of ways to stabilize the region. It was a clear manifestation of the high level of awareness of the responsibility bestowed upon Al-Assad in line with the expectations of the neighboring states amidst the political tension in the region. Tension escalated in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine after the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Lebanon. This visit signaled the beginning of unofficial activities meant to cause division in the small country.

Nobody can rule out the possibility that the negative repercussions of Ahmadinejad’s position will affect the Arab nations, especially since the message from Hezbollah heartland states the root is now based in Iran – along the Mediterranean Sea. It was the beginning of Tehran’s announcement of the real motive behind the visit. At the time, Ahmadinejad was quoted as saying, “The children of South Lebanon will determine the future of the region. The great victory is at the doorstep but resistance is the only way to achieve this victory.” This is tantamount to creating a new launch pad for the Iranian political activities to wreak havoc in Lebanon.

What kind of future does the defeated Ahmadinejad want to build for the region? Which victory was he referring to, considering he is still grappling with the international sanctions and internal conflicts? Without a doubt, Ahmadinejad’s message has reached the intended recipients in the West and East. He declared direct contact between the mercenaries and Tehran no longer requires Damascus to act as mediator. They don’t need the Syrians between the origin and the branch anymore. It is now glaring that Hezbollah is no longer a card in the hands of Syria. Ahmadinejad’s message will most likely usher in a different era between two allies — Syria and Iran, especially when Syria begins to feel the dangerous consequences of changing the rules of the game played by Iran, as well as the effects of this change on the entire region and the possible losses once Iran reaches the end.

The latest incident in Lebanon exposed disparities between the roles played by Iran and Syria. They are no longer partners as they were in the past, since Hezbollah has taken the place of Syria and has begun to play its roles. The incident clearly showed the new Iranian direction towards aborting the roles of Syria in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, but this will not be the end of the road. On the contrary, Syria has an option to join forces with the Arabs, provided it plays a role in line with the policy of rejecting strategic changes in any Arab nation, because whoever walks towards the changes will suffer the negative repercussions.

Amid the recent Iranian activities, the Arab nations, led by Saudi Arabia, have started paving the way for Damascus to embrace the international community and come out of its shell. The effort has been fruitful as reflected in the regional and international indices, which show the openness of the US and Europe to Syria, even though this may be limited, it is still a clear indication that the Arabs do not want to leave Damascus to be an easy prey for Tehran.

Saudi Arabia has created a suitable environment for Arabs to embrace Syria and rescue it from the claws of Iran. The Syrian-Saudi summit is a new phenomenon; thereby, changing the entire equation and strengthening the Arab alliance. This will remove some seeds of discord that Iran has planted among Arabs and put everything back to their normal position. These seeds will not bear any fruit in Lebanon, Iraq or Palestine, especially since Iran has revealed its true colors and its attempt to dodge the international sanctions, which had been strangling the country.

The Riyadh summit has put everything in the right perspective to prevent Iran from escalating tension in the region, considering the information on the Israeli military moves against Lebanon and possibly Syria. The world powers have been preventing the region from falling into the Iranian pitfall, in addition to strengthening the Arab roles in Iraq and setting up an umbrella to protect Palestinians from the Iranian propaganda through its proxies.

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By Michael Ledeen

Source: Pajamas Media Faster, Please! Blog

October 18, 2010

I’ve received many questions about the recent explosion at a Revolutionary Guards base near Khorramabad (near the Iraqi border) that reportedly killed nearly twenty Guardsmen and, according to some accounts, destroyed several new Shehab missiles.    The regime described it as an accident, but even the Washington Post’s Thomas Erdbrink, who often shows a touching tendency to accept the official version of events, had his doubts: “It was unclear whether the incident…was an accident or the result of terrorism or sabotage.”  He was right to wonder; there have been 3 such events at the Imam Ali Base in the last several months, and while there are lots of accidents in Iran, it is most unlikely that repeated explosions are all accidental.

The base is a training center for high-level Iranian officers and experienced foreign fighters. According to a reliable Iranian source, the foreigners were being trained in the use of roadside bombs, the so-called IEDs that account for most American and other NATO casualties in Afghanistan. Those were apparently ignited, along with jet fuel, and killed 19 Iranian officers and badly burnt another 14, most of whom are in critical condition. No figures are available for the foreigners, although some of them were certainly killed or wounded.

The base was attacked by two men on motorcycles, who first killed two security guards and then launched rockets over the walls into the base. There were indeed four missiles at the site, but they were short-range missile with a range of 200-250 kilometers, not the latest generation of intermediate-range Shehabs.

The latest deaths bring the number of RG casualties in the last 26 days to 102, which gives you a sense of the intensity of the internal war against the Iranian regime.  Earlier in the month, armed gunmen attacked police in Kurdestan, killing five and wounding four others.
Meanwhile, Iranian workers and merchants were also challenging the regime, with workers walking off the job in the South and the operators of the gold bazaars locking up their shops all over the country, nominally in protest against the new 3% value added tax, but actually against the regime’s increasingly centralized control over the national economy.  Negotiations to end the shutdown broke down early this week,  as it became evident that the regime was determined to crush the traditional merchant class.  Indeed, the Iranian currency becomes weaker by the day, which has the duel effect of ruining the traders and smugglers who have long been the source of merchandise for the bazaars, and further empowering the Revolutionary Guards who have abundant quantities of hard currency from their (legal and illegal) oil business.

In addition to pauperizing the merchant class, the regime is striking at other middle-class sectors by rationing gasoline and ending subsidies for such staples as cooking oil, sugar, and rice. The subsidies will be replaced by aid – in the form of coupons – for the staples, which will be given to supporters and withheld from opponents. In this manner, the Iranian economy will increasingly resemble that of North Korea, albeit with a very wealthy state and elite, living the good life financed by oil revenues.

These measures – some of which have been announced, while others will emerge in coming weeks – will further enrage most Iranians, who are already alienated from the regime. The ranks of the enragés include many senior clerics, and in recent weeks the regime has assaulted their mosques, beaten and arrested their followers and even family members, and shut down their websites and Facebook pages.  The regime’s critics are not going quietly.  The Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, for example, who is a member of the Assembly of Experts that chooses the supreme leader, has recently challenged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s legitimacy, saying that “the only duties of someone selected by the Assembly of Experts are ‘…to coordinate the efforts of the three branches of government and to prevent the violation of citizens’ rights by the three branches.’ This bold claim means that the Supreme Leader’s powers are much more limited than is currently the case.  Dastgheib asserts, “This person…has no right to interfere in the affairs of the people.”

Other senior clerics have taken similar positions, and Khamenei is traveling today to the holy city of Qom, where he will meet with many of them in an attempt to shore up his waning legitimacy.  Matters have gone too far, too many people have been killed, tortured and humiliated to expect the Qom clerical establishment to fully embrace Khamenei.  Remarkably, at least some of these men of the turban are prepared for martyrdom rather than accept Khamenei’s tyranny. I doubt we will see a mass rejection of Khamenei in Qom, however, and in all likelihood many will support the supreme leader, and those who reject him will face harsh treatment when the leader returns to the capital.

Thus the vice of oppression tightens more forcefully on all levels of Iranian society, as the regime uses the only method that can keep Khamenei and Ahmadinejad in power: the iron fist, combined with foreign adventure (about which more in my next blog).

Can it last? The regime would surely fall in short order if its opponents received a modicum of real support from the West, but no such support seems to be forthcoming from the feckless men and women who mistakenly fancy themselves to be real leaders, and who one day will have earned a shameful page in the history of this period.

And so the agony of Iran continues, until the inevitable explosion of righteous wrath finally destroys this evil regime.

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By Amir Taheri

Source: Asharq AlAwsat

October 18, 2010

No one knows what political epitaph would eventually describe Mahmound Ahmadinejad’s colourful tenure as President of the Islamic Republic in Iran.

However, judging by his Panglossian optimism, which borders on naiveté, one may suggest the following: ‘ He was undone by his illusions.’

To hear him tell it, the Islamic Republic is now one of only two powers offering mankind rival visions for the future. (The other one is the American ‘Great Satan’.) On his return from a recent visit to New York, he also claimed that he is more popular among ‘the American people’ than President Barack Obama.

(Don’t say: that’s no surprise!)

Many Iranians have decided to treat ‘their’ president as a stand-up comedian whose chief function is to provoke and entertain.

To some Iranians, however, fear that Ahmadinejad’s cocktail of empty boasts and dangerous provocations, which may end in war, has already led the country into what could be its most serious economic crisis since the early 1960s.

The annual economic report of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), published this week, confirms that fear by painting a grim picture.

According to the report, Iran’s population rose from 70 to 73 million while gross domestic product (GDP) either stood still or actually dropped. This is the second year running that the bank gives no figures for economic growth, persuading most economists that the GDP has actually declined. There is ample evidence in the report to confirm that view. The value of the rial, Iran’s national currency, has dropped by around 20 per cent compared to a basket of leading currencies. In the past few weeks, there has been a rush on the gold market, recalling the old days when the glittering metal was regarded as the sole reliable sore of value. Surprised by the sharp rise in the price of gold, the gold bazaars in Tehran, and several other major cities, simply pulled down their shutters. The gold merchants were promptly accused of wanting to keep their gold to sell at an even higher price later.

The gold rush in Tehran is matched by the rush to withdraw deposits fro banks to buy foreign currency, especially the US dollar. This quest for liquidity has hit the hitherto buoyant property market very hard with average prices falling by 21 per cent during the past 12 months.

Government finances are so tight that some private contractors have not been paid for more than a year. Doctors working for state-owned insurance schemes have not received salaries since last March.

Government income in real terms has dropped significantly. For example, oil exports dropped by 13/3 per cent or over 600,000 barrels a day, the highest fall since the late 1970s when the country was passing through the chaos of the Khomeinist revolution. This means a net loss of income for the government at around $16 billion.

Partly to cover that loss, President Ahmadinejad has decided that his long cherished, but always postponed, plan for ending government subsidies should be implemented within the next five months. Many economists believe that ending the subsides, which cost the public treasury a whopping $20 billion a year, is long overdue. Most of the existing subsidies were introduced under the late Shah, a move seen by critics as an attempt by the regime to buy the silence of the poor masses.

That the Iranian economy is in recession is made clear by two figures.

The first is a seven per cent drop in imports to $55 billion with non-oil exports sanding at $21 billion. Because almost all of Iran’s non-traditional industries depend on imported raw material and parts, the figure indicates a significant slowdown. The second figure is a 40 per cent drop in private applications for new building permits. This means that the building industry, Iran’s most dynamic for over a decade, has suffered a major setback.

The CBI report contains two items of good news. The first is the fall in the rate of inflation to 11 per cent, although several independent studies still put it at 15 per cent. The second is government’s foreign currency reserves, built up to deal with sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

Ahmadinejad believes that the two above factors provide the ‘ ideal combination’ for ending the subsidies at break-neck speed.

The first subsidies to go concern 16 key items of mass consumption including water, bread, electricity, gasoline and bus fares in major cities. Cutting these subsidies alone would save the government around $12 billion a year. However, it would also increase the cost of living for the poorest families by around 20 per cent.

According to the Ministry of Industries, ending subsidies could also damage 23 major industries including iron and steel, chemical and pharmaceutical, construction and public transport. Some industries may be driven out of the market by cheaper imports from such countries as China and India. At a time that the Iranian economy is losing around 3000 jobs each day, the collapse of a major segment of the industrial sector could plunge he labour market into an even deeper crisis. Right now, unemployment rate in Iran stands at 15 per cent. The collapse of subsidies industries could push it to 20 per cent or more.

To be fair, not all of this is of Ahmadinejad’s doing. A good part of the current crisis is due to the global recession that has hit virtually all countries. However, there is no doubt that Ahmadinejad’s early profligacy is partly responsible for today’s tight finances. The UN imposed sanctions, for which Ahmadinejad is partly to blame, also bear part of the responsibility. Nor could one overlook the fact that Ahamdinejad’s policy of gratuitous provocation abroad has had a negative impact on the economy by persuading some Iranians that the country is heading for war and that the wisest course is to buy gold and foreign currency.

As is always the case, the poorest Iranians are likely to end up paying the bill for a wayward president’s questionable illusions.

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By Tariq Alhomayed

Source: Asharq AlAwsat

October 16, 2010

Ahmadinejad’s first visit to Lebanon has adjourned, and we saw how Hezbollah’s guest did not throw any stones at Israel, and did not even visit Fatima Gate [former border crossing between Lebanon and Israel]. In fact, other than Ahmadinejad’s defense of Hezbollah in the face of the Hariri tribunal, he did not say anything new. Ahmadinejad said that “a friend and a patriot was viciously assassinated” and “we see how news is fabricated to direct accusations at the remaining friends in an effort to reach worthless aims by sowing seeds of division.” What is interesting is that Ahmadinejad referred to the martyr [Rafik] Hariri as “a friend” but what friendship is he talking about; especially as Hariri was assassinated 5 years ago, and Ahmadinejad himself has only been in office for approximately this period of time?

Therefore, an initial reading [of this visit] is that Ahmadinejad rushed to Lebanon in response to the historic joint-visit undertaken by Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Lebanon, travelling on the same airplane. This means that the Iranians, who have clearly become fed up with the Syrian disposition – although this is an article for another time – decided to publicly visit the country this time, in order to rescue Nasrallah from the findings of the Hariri tribunal. This is what Ahmadinejad’s speech in the southern suburbs of Beirut revealed, and here it is important that we recall the surprise on Nasrallah’s face on the day that he made his famous speech saying “they have acquitted Syria” in order to understand Iran’s concern for Hezbollah today.

Of course, Hezbollah responded even more enthusiastically to Ahmadinejad by organizing a popular reception [in Lebanon] the likes of which he cannot find in Iran, in order for Hezbollah to affirm that Iran enjoys long-standing popularity in Lebanon. A good sign of this was the picture that was hung up in the Lebanese village of Qana which was made up of images of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, Nasrallah, Nabih Berri, Musa al-Sadr, and Mostafa Chamran. In fact, the latter [Chamran] is a story in himself; he was the first Iranian Defense Minister during the Khomeini era, he also helped Musa al-Sadr to form the Amal movement, and was later killed at the hands of the Iraqi forces during the Iran – Iraq war. This picture [in the village of Qana] was underscored with the words “From Lebanon to Iran…One Destiny.”

Therefore Ahmadinejad’s visit may have canceled out Nabih Berri’s famous quote in which he said that he always bets on the “Syrian – Saudi equation” for it seems that we are facing a Syrian – Saudi – Iranian equation today. This can be seen in Nasrallah meeting with his Iranian sponsor, which represents internal protection from the dangers of the Hariri tribunal. This is something that reduces the Syrian role in Lebanon, of course, and that is why we heard Nasrallah praising Iran and its divine role and its Wali al-Faqih [Guardian of the Jurists].

If this analysis is correct – and this is something that will be made clear in the coming days – this means that the Lebanese peace table is standing on three legs and will not remain upright for long, especially as the sectarian division in Lebanon has intensified. All of which means that the situation in Lebanon has been further complicated, and that Iran has decided to operate in Lebanon openly rather than from behind a smokescreen, and it is sufficient to note that Nasrallah’s meeting with Ahmadinejad took place in the Iranian embassy, and that Nasrallah came out to meet Ahmadinejad like any other Iranian subject in Lebanon.

Tariq Alhomayed is the Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, the youngest person to be appointed that position.