The coup government and the establishment of religion

November 28, 2009

Persian source:

Ever since the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s presidency (the 9th government), this question has been asked. In fact, during the election campaign four years ago he relentlessly attacked Hashemi Rafsanjani and this attracted many common people who were dissatisfied with the establishment. Thus, in the run-off election Ahmadinejad was able to defeat Rafsanjani. For many people the defeat of Rafsanjani meant that the main pillars of power, the clergy had been defeated and a new chapter had begun in the life of the Islamic Republic.

This, along with the attitude of the ninth government, especially the treatment of the ‘Independent Clergy,’ strengthened the idea that Ahmadinejad is against the clergy. But there are some points to consider regarding Ahmadinejad’s government, especially his recent coup government:

Most elements of the coup government, had lower and mid-level positions ten years ago. And since they always thought of themselves as true owners and looters of the regime and the revolution, they were always dissatisfied from their smaller share of the pie when it came to government contracts. This is why in recent years they mixed their opportunist views with getting a bigger share. From one side they would use the ruling clergy as a front to take a bigger share of government contracts. From the other side, they would spread rumors and jokes about how the clergy was plundering the country’s wealth.

After President Khatami’s election 10 years ago, with the talks of a “dual government” under the auspices of the Revolutionary Guards and “parallel organizations,” the “Economic Mafia” started throwing stones under the wheels of Khatami’s government and got closer to the top of the pyramid.

This included “illegal ports of entry,” smuggling, etc. Toward the end of Khatami’s government (the reform government), the Revolutionary Guards and the Security forces slowly started to come out of the shadows and tried to pretend like they were closer to lower classes of people to show a positive face. From one side, some bright managers, with financial support, left the Revolutionary Guards and entered the industry sector and the sports sector.  From the other side, the Basij began to cultivate lands and water lands for free for farmers. They vaccinated people and got involved in many popular activities in order to create an image of “the builders,” “the people’s force,” by the right wing.

When the election four years ago went to the run-off round, many people thought that the dubious elimination of Karroubi was part of the conspiracy by Rafsanjani. While the middle class was disillusioned by the presidency of Khatami, Ahmadinejad was able to rise to power with some bogus promises and even take votes from the most disgruntled parts of the population.

Many people, thinking that Rafsanjani’s defeat meant the defeat of the clergy, voted for Ahmadinejad and therefore, Ahmadinejad’s government tried to show a new way of encountering the clergy and to keep the hatred toward the clergy alive. For the disillusioned, many decades of rule by Rafsanjani had made him the symbol of the clergy. Ahmadinejad was thinking that he could keep the economic corruption under covers by acting like he was on the side of the poor, and in a two-faced strategy, pretend like he was confronting the clergy.

The mentality of the military personnel and security forces close to Ahmadinejad was that the clergy throughout years of rule was not successful and were only thinking about filling their own and their children’s pockets. Therefore, the majority of the Iranians had turned against Islam and were anti-religion (one can find traces of this thought process in speeches by Mashaii, Ahmadinejad’s deputy). The security forces then can appear as the third force and use this anti-religion potential among the young and poor people to seal the control of the major economic and power centers of the country.

But two things worked against this strategy: First, Ahmadinejad’s government was itself a link in the chain of the most backward branch of the clergy. The “army of the martyrs,” “the plain clothed thugs,” “the Islamic Guidance Army,” etc. were the most active ingredients of Ahmadinejad’s government. These were the groups that had paralyzed the former president Khatami’s government and Ahmadinejad’s government would not be able to pay their fair share and still keep control of the executive branch. That’s why the repression of the youngsters and women increased during Ahmadinejad’s government and became institutionalized to a point where many youngsters were reminiscing Khatami and Rafsanjani years. This, while in the beginning that the potential to get away from religious edicts was the basis of Ahmadinejad’s campaign four years ago.

The second and more important theoretic error as part of Ahmadinejad’s government strategy lied in the difference between anti-religion and secularism. For them secularism meant being anti-clergy. According to this theory a secular citizen or a secular politician is someone who prays, drinks alcoholic beverages, and is against mandatory hijab. This is completely wrong and political secularism has civil dimensions and has nothing to do with people’s personal lives.

Therefore a political activist can follow religion in his private life. In fact the major damage that caused Ahmadinejad’s government’s defeat in the election and the rise of the Green Movement has its roots in this contradiction. This is because secularism in its true definition, not only separates (music, sports and politics) from religion, but more importantly, it frees religion from political religion. It’s worth noting that Shiite religion is not confined to the “Leadership position” and its absolute power, and there are the clergy who even oppose such leadership. They even deny that Friday Prayer’s is part of Islam.

There are also well-known religious scholars who think “The absolute Leadership” position is only for the backward people. When the society reaches a mature age when people reach a civil maturity where they can distinguish between the hatred for the clergy and civil and political freedoms, that’s when theories put forward by the Ahmadinejad government are neutralized. That’s because that kind of thinking is only possible in a sick environment. One can find traces of this type of thinking in today’s society: while a decade ago was cause for attack on ayatollah Montazeri’s residence, today many people are freely discussing secularism and nobody is able to attack them.

Therefore the participation of the con men in the cabinet and the announcements regarding the end of Islamism and beginning of friendship with Israel, will never attract secularists to Ahmadinejad’s government.

Translation- Tour Irani for